In this article, we address physical layer security in the distributed antenna (DA) systems, where eavesdroppers (Eves) can intercept the information transmitted for the intended receiver (IR). To realize a device-centric, power-efficient, and physical-layer security-aware system, we aim at minimizing power consumption by jointly designing DA selection and secure precoding. Different from the conventional artificial noise (AN)aided secure transmission, where AN is treated as an undesired element for the IR, we design AN such that it is constructive to the IR while keeping destructive to the Eves. Importantly, we investigate two practical scenarios, where the IR and Eves' channel state information (CSI) are imperfectly obtained or the Eves' CSI is completely unknown. To handle the CSI uncertainties, we solve the problems in probabilistic and deterministic robust optimizations, respectively, both satisfying the IR' signalto-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement by the use of constructive AN and addressing security against the Eves. The simulation results demonstrate our algorithms consume much less power compared to the centralized antenna (CA) systems with/without antenna selection, as well as the DA systems with conventional AN processing. Last but not least, by the proposed algorithms, the activation of DAs closely relates to devices' locations and quality-of-service (QoS) requirements, featuring a device-centric and on-demand structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS communications for the future Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0 are required to provide power-efficient transmission together with a high security level. In the last decade, centralized multiple-input-multipleoutput (MIMO) has been considered as a potential technique due to its high throughput and additional spatial diversity for enhancing physical layer security [1] - [3] . However, it requires extremely high-power consumption caused by the fully activated antennas, and centralized MIMO often suffers from Manuscript an equal level of path loss (PL) from the antenna array to one device (or user) caused by the co-located antenna (CA) deployment. Besides, edge devices in CA deployment may not be well served due to the severe propagation attenuation, otherwise, significant transmission power is required for compensating the propagation loss. To create a device-centric and power-efficient structure, the distributed antenna (DA) systems have attracted much attention [4] . By geographically distributing the antennas and hence placing them closer to devices, the DA systems can reduce the PL impact and obtain the blockage-free effect, helping extend coverage and maintain connectivity of networks. Since the contributions of each DA may vary practically due to the location of the devices [5] , system power consumption can be significantly reduced by only activating those DAs contributing the most, which also consequently facilitate an on-demand and flexible network structure. The concepts of device-centric DA are particularly suited for communications in industrial environments, where antennas can be carefully planned and distributed in the ceilings of large factories to effectively extend network coverage without crucial increment of power consumption, and are, therefore, a key contender for industry IoT and Industry 4.0 deployments [6] . Besides, the DA systems have been extensively deployed as an important part of the landline infrastructure in the USA (e.g., Michigan and Ohio) promulgated by the FCC Pole Attachment Order 11-50 [7] . The DA systems have also been considered in the 5G systems to form user-centric manner virtual cells [8] , where users can find DAs in its vicinity to communicate with. In an indoor environment, the DA systems can be applied to provide seamless coverage [9] , such as commercial use of WiFi. It was pointed out in the FP7 EARTH project [10] that for a small-scale node (such as DA and femto or pico node), the power consumption is dominated by the power amplifier (PA) and circuit power. Generally, PA power consumption is closely related to the transmission power and drain efficiency at transmitters. On the other hand, circuit power consumption contains multiple power-consuming components. The power consumption of an active DA mainly comes from digital/analog converter, analog/digital converter, optical/electrical converter, upconverter, filter, synthesizer, etc., while the power consumption of one DA can be significantly reduced by switching it off [11] .
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that due to the proximity to transmitting antennas, it is also easier for potential eavesdroppers (Eves) to obtain the signal transmitted to the intended device receiver (IR), and physical layer security issue in the DA systems becomes more challenging. In the past decade, physical layer security has been extensively investigated as a complement to secure wireless communications. For the nonartificial noise (AN)-aided scheme, physical layer security is addressed by solely designing beamforming. One can provide a maximized gain toward the IR's channel with no regard for leakage into the Eve's channel, or transmit signal toward null space of the Eves with reduced gain into the IR's channel [12] . Besides, CVX or singular value decomposition-based precoding can be adopted to make a tradeoff between maximizing gain to the IR and steering a null at the Eves [13] , which is the secrecy capacity achieving scheme at the cost of high computationally expensive. To further address secrecy outage performance with low power consumption, Lei et al. [14] , [15] investigated the secrecy outage performance with antenna selection while preserving the transmission diversity, benefiting from multiple antennas configuration. Nevertheless, the above approach do not address AN-aided secure transmission, which is the focus of this article. Differently, for the AN-aided secure transmission, AN is generated at transmitter together with a confidential message to jam potential Eves. When the Eves' channel state information (CSI) is unknown at the transmitter, the AN is produced such that it lies in the null space of the IR channel [16] , [17] . Since the potential Eves channel is different from that of IRs, the isotropic AN could degrade the potential Eves receiving performance while imposing minimal effect on the IRs. Based on the principle, optimal power allocation [18] , delay minimization [19] , and PHY security with randomly distributed Eves [20] have been investigated. When the Eves' CSI is known at the transmitter, AN could be injected to the direction of the Eves in a spatial manner, which is more efficient than the isotropic manner [21] , [22] . Based on the AN-aided secure scheme, secrecy rate [23] , [24] , outage probability [25] , and power consumption [3] , [22] have been addressed recently. On the specific topic of secure transmission in the DA systems, Gao et al. [26] investigated SINR maximization problem for DA systems, where AN is generated by DAs to interfere the Eves. Wang et al. [27] maximized the ergodic secrecy rate in the DA systems, where AN and signal are jointly designed and transmitted at each DA. In [3] , the power minimization problem was demonstrated for the DA systems, where the potential Eves are considered as idle IRs and scavenge energy from AN. It is worth noting that, regardless of isotropic or spatial AN transmission, AN is treated as an undesired element at the IR and its leakage effect needs to be minimized [28] .
The aforementioned research, however, treated AN as a catastrophic element and mitigated the effect of AN at the IR as much as possible. If AN can be carefully designed at the transmitter, it may be beneficial to the IR in terms of improving signal-to-interference-plusnoise ratio (SINR) based on the concept of constructive interference (CI). The concept of CI was first introduced by [29] in code division multiple access. Then a rotated zero-forcing (ZF) precoding scheme was proposed in [30] and [31] further proposed that all the interference can be constructive by designing precoding in symbol level. Recently, the concept of CI was applied into cognitive radio [32] , large-scale multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) [33] , multiuser multi-input-single-output (MISO) [34] - [36] , and wireless power transfer [37] . Based on the aforementioned work in CI, Khandaker et al. [38] proposed a scheme to utilize AN in a CA system. However, the fully activated antennas in [38] lead to enormous power consumption.
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, in this article, we present joint design of DA selection and secure precoding to minimize total power consumption, subjected to physical layer security constraints. Importantly, we consider two practical scenarios and solve the problems from two different prospectives of robust optimizations, namely, probabilistic and deterministic robust optimizations. Our contributions are summarized in the following. 1) We investigate the power minimization problems under the IR's QoS requirement and physical layer security constraints against the Eves. DA selection and precoding are jointly designed to fully utilize the additional degrees of freedom in antennas' activation/deactivation and beneficial effect of AN, which significantly reduce the total power consumption yet maintaining the IR's SINR and security constraints against the Eves. 2) We exploit joint DA selection and robust precoding in two practical scenarios: first, when the IR and Eves' CSI are imperfectly obtained, and second, when the Eves' CSI is completely unknown. Then, we investigate the total power minimization problems for the two scenarios in probabilistic and deterministic manners, respectively. In the first scenario, the IR's SINR constraint and security against the Eves are issued by chance-constrained formulations from the prospective of probabilistic robust optimization, while the IR's SINR constraint and security against the Eves are guaranteed with all the CSI uncertainties from the prospective of deterministic robust optimization. On the other hand, when the Eves' CSI is completely unknown at the transmitter side in the second scenario, the IR's SINR requirement is addressed by the probabilistic or deterministic robust optimization, while the security toward the Eves is addressed by confining a minimum power level of AN.
3) Four corresponding low-complexity algorithms are
proposed to minimize the total power consumption for the two scenarios, in terms of probabilistic and deterministic manners. At the same time, AN is kept constructive to the IR whereas destructive to the Eves. Complexities of the algorithms are analytically demonstrated. 4) A device-centric network structure is demonstrated by the proposed schemes, compared to the CA counterpart. Explicitly, the working status of each DA is flexibly determined by the IR and Eves' positions to provide on-demand services: the DAs close to devices have higher probabilities of activation, while the DAs far from devices have higher probabilities of being idle for saving power. Furthermore, the power consumption of the DA deployment remains low regardless of the devices' positions and power-efficient transmission is always featured, while the power consumption of the CA deployment demonstrates a significant increment when the devices move to edge area.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE
In this section, the system model is introduced in Section II-A and the concept of CI is briefly discussed in Section II-B.
A. System Model
We consider a DA system at downlink, which is depicted in Fig. 1 . All DA ports are connected to the central unit through a noise-free wired fronthaul for cooperative communications. Central unit is equipped with N DAs transmitting confidential message to the IR in the presence of K possible Eves. We focus on secure precoding design with passive Eves, where the Eves only intercept confidential message but do not actively launch attack [14] - [28] . 1 The IR and Eves are all equipped with single antenna for simplicity. CSI is obtained by channel estimation in the training phase, based on channel reciprocity as in [4] and [39] . Without loss of generality, we assume that all the DAs share the same drain efficiency and their PAs work in the linear region. Per-DA power constraint is applied, which is essentially different from joint power constraint in the CA systems.
B. Constructive Interference
By the concept of CI, interference pushes the received signals away from the detection threshold [31] . The increased distance to the detection threshold can effectively improve the 1 With active Eves, there has been extensive research focusing on device authentication [40] , [41] , detecting active attacks [42] , and offering countermeasures to guarantee secret communications [43] , [44] . Higher layer authentication works as a digital signature to verify the validity of a legitimate nodes identity from unauthorized nodes before establishing legitimate communications links for data transmission [43] - [46] . In this article we focus on secure precoding design for already authenticated links to enhance security against potential eavesdroppers [14] - [28] . In addition to MAC authentication, there are other authentication schemes, including network-layer authentication [47] , transport-layer authentication [48] , and application layer authentication [46] . In particular, the key point of PHY-authentication is to recognize the PHY identities of wireless devices for authentication purpose [49] , [50] , such as CSI-based authentication (the propagation characteristics of wireless channels) [51] - [53] , RF recognition approaches (also known as device fingerprints) [54] , and wiretap code-based authentication [55] . Another line of research is to model the transmitter and malicious jammer as players in a game-theoretic formulation with the mutual information as the payoff function, and to identify the optimal transmit strategies for both parties. Taking ergodic MIMO secrecy rate as payoff function, [57] employed Nash equilibria to optimize the payoff function. Based on the stochastic game theory, the transmitter in [56] chooses among transmitting, remaining silent or acting as a jammer for secure transmission. Based on mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, Zhu et al. [58] conducted relay selection at uplink transmission to improve transmission rate. Besides, the security design with compromised base station involves intrusion detection at higher layer [59] , or distributed storage coding (also known as regenerating codes) design [60] . The former aims to detect the compromised nodes while the latter is normally employed for distributed storage systems (DDSs). That is, it is desired that legitimate users be able to reconstruct the original files by retrieving data from a subset of storage nodes, while protecting it from being reconstructed by Eves, even with compromised storage nodes [60] . Note that the essence of DA systems is completely different from that of DDS. For the DA systems, each DA only serves as geographically positioned remote radio head without ability of data storage, while the essence of distributed data systems is that chunks of data files are stored across different storage sites based on the cloud technology. Hence, the motivation of DA is to extend network coverage and enable the user-centric network structure, while the distributed data systems are employed for distributing data into different storage sites for load balancing. receiving performance. Denote w ∈ C N×1 and z ∈ C N×1 as precoding vector and AN at the transmitter side. Without loss of generality, QPSK is employed as the constellation scheme and the secure precoding design with generic constellation schemes is discussed in Section V. Denote x d = de jφ d as the information-bearing symbol transmitted for the IR. The received signal at the IR and the kth Eve can be calculated as
denotes the channel conditions between the DAs and the IR. h k ∈ C N×1 denotes the channel conditions between the DAs and the kth Eve. n d ∼ CN (0, σ 2 n ) and n k ∼ CN (0, σ 2 n ) denote the additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) at the IR and the kth Eve, respectively. Conventionally, the received SINR at the IR and the kth Eve are denoted as
where d and k denote the IR and the kth Eve's SINR, respectively. It can be seen from (1) that AN is treated as an undesired element at the IR. In contrast, the principle of constructive AN is to rotate the phase of the AN at transmitter and to align it with the desired signal at the IR. Since the transmitted signal can be also written as (w + ze −jφ d )x d , by exploiting the geometrical interpretation in Fig. 2 , generating constructive AN at the IR is equivalent to satisfying the following equation:
where θ = π/M, M is constellation size [38] , and γ d = σ n √ d , as shown in Fig. 2 . It can be seen from (2) that the AN becomes a beneficial element to the IR and the IR' SINR d is also embedded, indicating that generating constructive AN and satisfying the IR's SINR requirement are both guaranteed. Since the AN contributes to the useful signal power, the received SINR of the IR becomes
where transmission power can be efficiently reduced to achieve a target SINR.
III. POWER-EFFICIENT DA SELECTION AND SECURE PRECODING WITH IMPERFECT CSI
In Section III, we investigate power-efficient design with imperfect CSI, where the channels are given as h d =ĥ d + e d and h k =ĥ k + e k ∀k ∈ K.ĥ d ∈ C N×1 denotes the estimated CSI between the DAs and the IR with estimation error e d ∈ C N×1 .ĥ k ∈ C N×1 denotes the estimated CSI between the DAs and the kth Eve with estimation error e k ∈ C N×1 . By classic minimum mean-square error (MMSE) channel estimation, the channel estimation error can be modeled by a standard normal distributed variable or an error-bounded variable. Explicitly, it relates to the channel estimation setup, e.g., power of pilot signal. To fully exploit the power-efficient design with the uncertainties (channel estimation error), we handle 
the optimization problem in probabilistic and deterministic manners, respectively.
A. Probabilistic Robust Optimization
In Section III-A, we present the precoding design with the normal distributed CSI error. Without loss of generality, the channel estimation error of the IR and the kth Eve are written
In this section, a so-called DA-imperfect-prob optimization problem is first formulated by P1(a) (4), and then is transformed into P1(b) (15) by transforming the probabilistic constraints (C3) and (C4) into equivalent linear matrix inequality (LMI). Finally, the problem is given by P1(d) (20) after handling the binary variables in antenna selection.
1) Problem Formulation: Define precoding vector w ∈ C N×1 , whose nth element w n represents the precoding weight at the nth DA. Define AN vector z ∈ C N×1 , whose element z n represents the AN generated at the nth DA. Define DA selection vector t, whose element t n = {0, 1} means the nth DA is deactivated or activated, respectively. Taking advantage of CI, AN is properly rotated such that it contributes to the received signal power at the IR while remaining destructive to the Eves. To minimize the total power consumption, we jointly optimize precoding w, AN z, and DA selection vector t. Accordingly, the problem is formulated as
where α is the drain efficiency of the DAs. p DA denotes the maximum available transmission power at each DA. p on and p off represent the power consumption of each activated/deactivated DA, respectively. d and k are the SINR requirement for the IR and physical layer security against the kth Eve. η d and η k denote the probabilistic thresholds for the IR and the kth Eve, respectively. Evidently, (C1) imposes individual transmission power constraint at each DA, which is different from the joint transmission power constraint in the CA systems. (C2) constrains the selection vector to binary (on/off) elements. (C3) and (C4) guarantee the SINR constraint at the IR and address security against the Eves with probabilities η d and η k ∀k ∈ K.
2) Solution to the Problem: We now handle the probabilistic constraints (C3) and (C4). Define u = w + ze −jφ d . By exploiting trigonometry in (2), generating constructive AN for the IR and satisfying the IRs SINR requirement are both guaranteed. Under the provision of (2), the probabilistic constraint (C3) is equivalent to
Considering the effect of imperfect channel estimation, we have
Decomposing the real part and imaginary parts, (6) is equivalent to the two constraints in (7) 2
where
We now handle the first inequality in (7) . It is easy to obtain that the N-dimensional normal distributed vector a d,1 's expectation is
).
Evidently, the inequality can be interpreted as a cumulative probability function (cdf) of a normal distributed variable. By normalizing it into a standard normal distributed variable, we have
However, considering the complicated optimization problems, presenting the optimal precoding design with the joint probability may be infeasible. Moreover, the optimal precoding may not exist unless the joint probability satisfying some strict conditions [32] . Hence, to strike a good tradeoff between system performance and complexity, we approximate Pr{|X| ≤ c} ≥ η to Pr{X ≤ c} ≥ η and Pr{−X ≤ c} ≥ η. More important, given a high value of η, i.e., η = 95%, the approximation is tight and has been widely utilized in robust optimization design [32] .
Similarly, the second equation in (7) can be given as
and covariance matrix is calculated as
We now handle the security constraint in (C4) under the provision of destructive interference. According to geometrical interpretation, confining the kth Eve in the destructive region equals to satisfying | {h T k u}| ≥ ( {h T k u}−σ n k )tanθ . Taking into account of channel estimation error, (C4) can be expanded as
which can be transformed into a cdf of a standard normal distributed variable as we did in manipulating (5)- (9) . Finally, constraint (C4) holds if the two constraints in (13) are simultaneously satisfied
Again, by normalizing the two inequalities in (13) into cdf of standard normal distributed variables, we have
). After a series of transformation, the probabilistic constraints (C3) and (C4) in P1(a) are transformed into the corresponding quadratic constraints in (11) and (14) . Hence, P1(a) is reformulated as
argmin u,t n ,n∈N
According to the Schur complement, constraints (C3) and (C4) can be further transformed into (16) and (17), respectively,
is an auxiliary diagonal matrix whose elements are zero except the nth element ∀n ∈ N. The problem in (18) is still nonconvex due to the binary variables in (C2): t n = {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N, which can be relaxed to the following two constraints [62] :
where (C2a) is the relaxed version of the original constraint (C2), and (C2b) confines the value of t n ∀n ∈ N, close to 0 or 1. Hence, satisfying both constraints (C2a) and (C2b) is equal to satisfying the original constraint (C2). The introduced constraint (C2a) is simply a linear constraint, and the difficulty lies in handling (C2b). Introducing a penalty factor ϕ, typically of large value, and moving (C2b) into the objective function, the objective becomes into ([
The formulated objective function shares the same optimal design policy and result with the original one [62] . It is because with a large value of the penalty factor ϕ, the term ϕ( N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n ) in the objective function naturally pushes the value of t n ∀n ∈ N, close to 0 or 1, which exactly equals to the original constraint (C2). The last difficulty lies in the nonconvex term ϕ( 
is the difference of two convex functions with respect to the variable t n , and thus can be handled by successive convex approximation such that
where t (i) n denotes the value of t n at the ith iteration [61] and is updated in an iterative way to tighten the approximation. Therefore, the optimization becomes into
Now P1(d) (DA-imperfect-prob) is a standard semidefinite programming (SDP) problem, which can be readily solved by CVX. The loss of optimality only comes from relaxing the term ϕ( N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n ) by successive convex approximation. Since the term N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n is the difference of two convex functions with respect to the variables t n ∀n ∈ N, it can be relaxed into the difference of a convex function and a linear function N n=1 t n − N n=1 (t
n ), which serves as a strict upper bound of the original term. By updating the value of t (i) n ∀n ∈ N, in each iteration, nearoptimality is achieved benefiting from the convexity of the reformulated problem P1(d) [(20) ]. Moreover, since the successive convex approximation serves as the upper bound of the original problem, the optimization problem P1(d) is iteratively minimized and also lower bounded by the IR's SINR and physical layer security constraints. Hence, the near-optimality and convergence of the algorithm are confirmed [62] , [63] . Finally, the solver for P1(d) is summarized as follows.
Remark 1: Now we revisit the inequalities in (11) , and observe that the first inequality in (11) actually contains two inequalities [also applicable for the second inequality in (11) ]
where the first inequality of (21) suggests that the magnitude of u should be large enough while the second inequality of (21) suggests that the magnitude of u should be smaller enough to make (21) hold. Hence, given a high channel estimation error (the norm of matrix
is large), the value of η d or d needs to be properly reduced to make the optimization feasible. Revisiting the constraint for the kth Eve in (14) , we get ||
where only upper bounds on the magnitude of u are imposed. As a result, the constraint itself always confines a feasible region.
B. Deterministic Robust Optimization
In the previous section, we have solved the problem in a probabilistic manner, where the IR's QoS requirement and the physical layer security against the Eves are issued by the chance-constrained formulations. In this section, we handle the CSI uncertainties from a deterministic manner, where the IR's QoS requirement and the physical layer security toward the Eves are always guaranteed with the infinite CSI uncertainties. A so-called DA-imperfect-det optimization problem is first formulated by P2(a) (22) , and then the subsequent optimization form P2(b) (28) is obtained by applying S-procedure to handle nonconvex constraints (C9) and (C10). Finally, the final version in P2(c) (29) is obtained by relaxing the binary variables in antenna selection.
1) Problem Formulation: Define as the channel estimation uncertainties set, which contains all the possible CSI uncertainties and specifies an ellipsoidal uncertainty region for the estimated CSI [65] . To process the power minimization problem in terms of deterministic robust optimization, the formulation is given as
where (C9) and (C10) indicate deterministic SINR requirement for the IR and physical layer security constraints against Eves, such that the IR's worst-case SINR and Eves' best-case SINR as per the CSI error distribution obey the respective thresholds d and k ∀k ∈ K.
2) Optimization Solution: In line with the analysis in the previous section and defining w + ze −jφ d = u, constraint (C9) is equivalent to the following two inequalities in (23) , as shown at the bottom of the page, where d,1 = σ n d tanθ +ĥ
We now handle the first inequality of (23). To handle the infinite CSI uncertainties, we transform it into an LMI using Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure [64] 
By exploiting the structure of the first inequality in (23), we need to construct an inequality such that
≤ 0 to guarantee the first inequality in (23) always hold. We note that expanding the term yields a linear combination of the elements of e d . Since the 2-norm of the channel estimation error vector e d is bounded by the uncertainty-bounded channel estimation error model, the linear combination of the elements of e d is also bounded [65] . Hence, without loss of generality, σ UB d is assumed to serve as the upper bound of the constructed term. By applying the S-procedure, the constructed inequality guarantees the first inequality in (23) holds if and only if there exists λ d,1 ≥ 0 such that the LMI constraint in (24) holds
by which the uncertainties have been omitted. Now the first constraint in (23) containing infinite possibilities is transformed into a solvable LMI constraint in (24) . Accordingly, the second inequality in (23) can be transformed into
Now the constraint (C9) containing infinite possibilities is transformed into two deterministic LMIs in (24) and (25), respectively. Now we handle the kth Eve's constraint in (C10). According to the geometrical interpretation in Fig. 2, (C10) can be equivalently written by (26) , as shown at the bottom of the page, where k,1 =ĥ 
where σ UB k is similarly introduced to serve as an upper bound of the linear combination of the elements of e k . Now the nonconvex constraints (C9) and (C10) are replaced by equivalent LMI constraints. Defining U = u H u, the problem can be transformed as
To handle (C8), we transform it into two equivalent constraints (C8a) : t n = [0, 1], and (C8b) : N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n ≤ 0 ∀n ∈ N. Then, we introduce a penalty factor ϕ, typically of large value, and move (C8b) into the objective function. By applying successive convex approximation for the nonconvex term ϕ( N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n ), the problem becomes
which is ready to be solved as a standard SDP problem. The solver for the deterministic robust optimization problem is summarized by Algorithm 2, and its near-optimality and convergence are similar to that of Algorithm 1. Remark 2: By the deterministic manner, the SINR requirements need to be always satisfied at the cost of high transmission power. In contrast, by the probabilistic manner, the statistical SINR constraints allow proper violations, while obeying the preset outage thresholds. Moreover, when processing robust optimization deterministically, more intermediate variables are introduced by applying the S-procedure. As a result, the deterministic optimization generally leads to high power consumption and complexity.
IV. POWER-EFFICIENT DA SELECTION AND PRECODING WITHOUT EVES' CSI
In a number of practical scenarios, it is impossible to obtain the Eves' CSI information. In this section, we investigate security issue when imperfect CSI is only available for the IR while the Eves' CSI is completely unknown. Again, we solve the problem in probabilistic and deterministic manners.
A. Probabilistic Robust Optimization
To solve the problem in a probabilistic manner, the channel estimation error is modeled by a standard normal distributed variable, as presented in Section III-A. A so-called DAunknown-prob optimization problem is first formulated by P3(a) (30) , and then the subsequent optimization form P3(b) (31) is obtained by handling the nonconvex constraint (C19). Finally, the final version is obtained in P3(c) (32) by relaxing the binary variables in antenna selection. Since the IR' CSI can be imperfectly obtained, we can still guarantee the IR' SINR requirement by a probabilistic constraint. However, to address physical layer security in absence of any Eves' CSI, we can only set a minimum power level of AN.
1) Problem Formulation: The problem is formulated as
where constraint (C20) is imposed to guarantee the minimum power level of AN and is of importance when the Eves' CSI is unknown [43] . The essence of constraint (C20) is further summarized in Appendix I for brevity.
2) Optimization Solution:
To solve the problem, we transform the probabilistic constraint (C19) into equivalent LMI, as shown by (16) . Define u = w + ze −jφ d , U = u H u, and Z = z H z. The problem is given by Solve P3(c) in (32) . Let t (i)
where constraint (C21) is imposed to guarantee that the AN generated on each DA is lower than the overall beamformer weight. For the binary variables involved constraint (C18), we again transform it into two equivalent constraints: (C18a) : t n = [0, 1] and (C18b) : N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n ≤ 0 ∀n ∈ N. Then we introduce a penalty factor ϕ, typically of large value, and move (C18b) into the objective function. By applying successive convex approximation for the nonconvex term ϕ( N n=1 t n − N n=1 t 2 n ), the formulated problem becomes
P3(c) (DA-unknown-prob):
argmin w,z,t
which is ready to solve as a standard SDP problem. The solver is summarized in Algorithm 3, and its near-optimality and convergence are similar to that of Algorithm 1.
B. Deterministic Robust Optimization
Now we present the power-efficient design in deterministic manner, for the case when the Eves' CSI is unknown. To guarantee the IR's SINR in a deterministic manner, we again define as the channel estimation uncertainties set, which contains all the possible CSI uncertainties and specifies an ellipsoidal uncertainty region for the estimated CSI [65] . A so-called DA-unknown-det optimization problem is first formulated by P4(a) (33) . After processing the nonconvex constraint (C29) and relaxing the binary variables in antenna selection, its final version is demonstrated by P4(b) in (34) . 1) Problem Formulation: As discussed above, the IR's SINR needs to be satisfied with all the CSI uncertainties. Again, we set a minimum power level of AN to address physical layer security issue. The problem is formulated as 
where (C29) denotes that the minimum possible SINR of the IR should be higher than the required d with all the CSI uncertainties.
2) Optimization Solution: By applying the S-procedure, we transform constraint (C29) that contains infinity probabilities into equivalent LMIs, as shown by (24) and (25) . Then, we handle the binary variables involved constraint (C28) by success convex approximation. Define u = w + ze −jφ d , U = u H u, and Z = z H z. The transformed problem becomes which is ready to be solved as a standard SDP problem, and the solver is given by Algorithm 4. Its near-optimality and convergence are similar to that of Algorithm 1.
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND CONSTRUCTIVE DESIGN FOR GENERIC MODULATION SCHEMES
In this section, we analytically examine the computational complexity of the proposed algorithms, and also discuss the applicability of constructive AN on other constellation schemes.
A. Complexity Analysis
We first examine the computational complexity of the proposed algorithms, and benchmark them against the related schemes in [3] , [21] , [22] , [24] , and [38] . For a fair comparison, the parameters in different algorithms have been modified to be consistent (the same number of users and antennas). It can be seen that the proposed algorithms run in an iterative manner, and we have several LMI and linear inequalities to handle in each iteration. For the interior-pointmethods-based solver, the overall complexity can be given as [66] . Specifically, ln(1/ ) relates to the accuracy setup. l i represents the number of iterations for updating DA selection vector. √ c b represents the barrier parameter measuring the geometric complexity of the conic constraints. c f and c g represent the complexities cost on forming and factorization of n × n matrix of the linear system. 3 Finally, the overall complexities of the proposed algorithms are summarized in Table I . It is observed that the proposed algorithms have polynomial time computational complexity, and only l ite iterations for updating DA section vector is required. The value of l ite is further demonstrated in Fig. 10 . Alternatively, by an exhaustive search, there are 2 N possibilities for antenna selection, which imposes extremely high computational complexity, especially, given a large number of antennas. Given the above discussion, it is worth highlighting that the proposed algorithms strike a favorable tradeoff between system performance and complexity. Moreover, compared to the probabilistic robust optimization, the deterministic optimization has 2 + 2K more linear inequalities in the first scenario and two more linear inequalities in the second scenario. However, the additional linear inequalities have minimal impacts on the complexities as they only linearly increase with the number of devices.
B. Constructive AN Design for Other Constellation Schemes
The principle of constructive AN is also applicable for other constellation schemes, with a minor revision on (2) . For illustration purpose, we provide a schematic representation for 16-QAM constellation points in Fig. 3 . To guarantee 3 Assume that the problem is subjected to P LMI and (M-P) secondorder cone (SoC) constraints, and the overall complexity consists of two parts: iteration complexity and per-iteration computation cost. 1) The iteration complexity is calculated as ln(1/ ) √ c b , where ln(1/ ) relates to the accuracy setup, c b = P p=1 k p + 2(M − P) represents the barrier parameter measuring the geometric complexity of the conic constraints, and k p represents the size of the pth LMI constraint. 2) On the other hand, the per-iteration computation is further dominated by: a) the formation of the n × n coefficient matrix of the optimization problem, which is calculated as c f = n P p=1 k 3 p + n 2 P p=1 k 2 p + n m p=P+1 k 2 p . The first two terms come from the P LMI constraints while the third term comes from M-P SoC constraints and b) the factorization of the coefficient matrix, which is calculated as c g = n 3 [66, eq. (18)].
constructive AN for the constellation points, we exploit the specific detection regions for each group of constellation points separately as detailed below.
For the Group of Constellation Points in the Box Labelled 1: Since they are all surrounded by the decision boundaries, the constraints should guarantee that the received signals achieve the exact constellation point so as not to exceed the decision boundaries. Hence, the constraints are
For the Group of Constellation Points Labelled 2: The constraints should guarantee that the received signals fall in the detection region away from the decision boundaries, which is the imaginary axis. The constraints are
For the Group of Constellation Points Labelled 3: The constraints should guarantee that the received signals fall in the detection region away from the decision boundaries, which is the real axis. The constraints are
For the Group of Constellation Points Labelled 4: The constraints should guarantee that the received signals fall in the detection region away from the decision boundaries. Here, the constellation points are not surrounded by the decision boundaries and that extend infinitely, and constraints are written as
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We present the simulated performance in this section. The central frequency is set to 2 GHz with 1 MHz bandwidth. The AWGN power spectral density is −174 dBm/Hz. A 100 × 100 m 2 square cell model is considered with N = 16 DAs, where the multiple DAs are evenly fixed [4] , [67] across the map, as shown in Fig. 4 . The number of the Eves is K = 14. The IR and Eves are randomly distributed across the map following uniform distribution [11] . To further highlight the advantages of the DA deployment, in Figs. 6, 9, and 10, subsets of the IR and Eves are partially placed at the coverage edge. DE of all PAs is set to α = 40%. Power consumption parameters are set to p on = 500 mW, p off = 50 mW, and p DA = 1000 mW, respectively. CSI error variance (in Sections III-A and IV-A) and error upper bound (in Sections III-B and IV-B) are set to 10 −4 . The PL model in [68] is adopted. Besides, we select the following two most relevant algorithms as benchmarks.
1) The DA system with conventional AN (DA-conv-AN) [3] , where AN is generated toward the null space of IRs whereas its disruptive effect should be kept for jamming potential Eves. Antennas are geographically deployed and antenna selection is enabled. 2) The CA MISO system without antenna selection (CAno-AS) [38] , where AN can be utilized as constructive element at IRs. Antennas are co-located and antenna selection is disabled. We also apply the proposed algorithms to the CA systems, which are referred as CA-imperfect-prob, CA-imperfect-det, CA-unknown-prob, and CA-unknown-det, respectively, in simulation, and the multiple antennas of CA systems are colocated in the map center. Fig. 5 shows the impact of the IR's SINR requirement d on the total power consumption with a random IR and Eve deployment. First, it can be seen that the proposed algorithms outperform the two benchmarks, namely, CA-no-AS and DA-conv-AN. It is because the proposed algorithms benefit from DAs' activation/deactivation, the DAs far from the devices may be deactivated for saving power. Hence, the proposed algorithms achieve a device-centric and on-demand network structure with higher degree of freedom over the CA-no-AS algorithm in [38] . Besides, our proposed algorithms rotate AN to make it constructive to the IR even with imperfect CSI, while AN is treated as an undesired element at the IR by conventional DA-conv-AN in [3] . Second, benefiting from geographical distribution of the DAs, the distances between the DAs and devices are shortened and the DA systems can always find near antennas to serve the devices. With the alleviated PL, DA can outperform its counterpart CA in terms of power-efficient transmission. Third, increasing the SINR d leads to higher power consumption, as more antennas become activated and dissipate higher circuit and transmission power. Also, the power consumption of the CA-no-AS increases slowly as the increased transmission power is overwhelmed by its circuit power consumption. Fourth, when the Eves' CSI is completely unknown, more power is dissipated compared to the scenario that the Eves' CSI is imperfectly obtained. It is because to address security, a minimum AN power level p AN is required, which is not efficient compared to the scenario that Eves' CSI is imperfectly obtained. Fig. 6(a) shows the total power consumption with different percentages of edge device. It demonstrates that with more devices at edge area, the power consumption of the DA system almost remains unchanged regardless of the devices' positions. It is because the geographically positioned DAs effectively extend the network coverage, and the proposed algorithms always activate near DAs for serving the devices. By contrast, the total power consumption of the CA systems keeps increasing when more devices move to edge area. This is because the CA systems have to activate more antennas and allocate higher transmission power to serve remote devices, which inevitably further improve the total power consumption of the CA systems. On the other hand, Fig. 6(b) shows the power consumption increment with different percentages of edge devices, benchmarked by the power consumption with 25% edge devices. It is obvious that the power consumption of the CA system increases significantly with more edge devices, and up to 1.3 dB increment of power consumption is achieved when all the devices are located in the edge area. Besides, it is worth noting that the power consumption increment of the CA-no-AS algorithm is lower than the other antenna selectionenabled CA systems, since the fully activated antennas of the CA-no-AS have dominated the power consumption, which makes the increment less significant. Fig. 7 shows the impact of the physical layer security requirement k on the total power consumption. First, a stringent security constraint, such as k = 10 −3 , leads to higher power consumption compared to a loose security constraint. It is because with a stringent constraint, higher power level of AN is needed to make the Eves' SINR lower than the requirement k . Second, since the proposed algorithms efficiently utilize AN as a constructive element, the power consumption of the proposed algorithms maintains low and the security against the Eves can be simultaneously addressed. Third, the DA systems always consume less power compared to the CA counterparts, benefiting from the device-centric structure. Fourth, when the Eves' CSI is unknown at transmitter, the power consumption is independent with the value of k . Hence, to address a stringent security requirement, one can properly increase the minimum power level of AN. That is, due to the channel disparity among the IR and Eves, the received signal of the Eves can be randomized in nature. Fig. 8 shows the impact of CSI estimation error variance σ 2 d and σ 2 k on the probabilistic robust optimizations (DAimperfect-prob and DA-unknown-prob), and the impact of estimation error upper bound σ UB d and σ UB k on the deterministic robust optimizations (DA-imperfect-det and DA-unknowndet). As can be seen, the power consumption of all the algorithms increases in a tough estimation scenario. In particular, for the probabilistic manner optimization, a higher CSI estimation error increases the norm of and thus the left-hand side of the first inequality in (21) also increases, as suggested by Remark 1. As a result, the amplitude of the precoder (also the transmission power) needs to be properly improved to make the optimization feasible, resulting in a increased total power. On the other hand, the deterministic manner robust optimization needs to keep the positive semidefinite characteristic for the matrices in (24)- (27) . This mathematically requires that all the leading principal minors in the matrices to be non-negative. Hence, with a higher CSI uncertainty, the amplitude of precoder (also the transmission power) needs to be property increased. As a result, the total power consumption of all the deterministic optimization is increased. A similar upward trend can be also observed by the CA-no-AS and DA-conv-AN, which process the CSI uncertainties based on the deterministic manner as well. Now, in the above Figs. 5-8, we have demonstrated that the proposed algorithms outperform the benchmarks. Importantly, it is clear from the above results that the proposed algorithms are most beneficial for edge users. Hence, in Figs. 9 and 10, we hereforth focus our attention on the scenario where all the IR and Eves are placed at the coverage edge to further highlight the advantages of DA deployment. Fig. 9 shows how the total power consumption is affected by the number of Eves. First, it can be seen that the DA deployment always outperforms its CA counterpart regardless of the number of the Eves. For the antenna selection-enabled CA systems, they almost dissipate the same power compared to the DA-conv-AN benchmark. Although AN can be utilized by the antenna selection-enabled CA systems, the systems have to allocate higher transmission power for compensating severe PL, which is exactly avoided by the DA-conv-AN benchmark. As a result, the advantage of utilizing AN vanishes in the antenna selection-enabled CA systems, especially, in the scenario that all the IR and Eves are located at edge area. Second, higher power for generating AN is required to address the physical layer security when the number of the Eves increases, and thus higher total power consumption is led. Applying the concept of constructive AN yet pushing the IR's received symbols to the constructive region, the weight of precoder w can be interestingly reduced. As a result, the total power consumption of the proposed algorithms increase slowly with more Eves. In contrast, the two benchmarks dissipate more power with the increased number of the Eves, either hindered by high circuit power consumption at the multiple antennas (CA-no-AS) or underutilized AN at the IR (DA-conv-AN). Especially for the DA-conv-AN scheme, since AN is treated as a harmful element at the IR, its power consumption increases significantly compared to other schemes. Third, when the Eves' CSI is completely unknown by the system, the total power consumption remains unchanged with the increased number of Eves. However, one may preset a higher power level of p AN to address the physical layer security against the Eves, at the cost of high power consumption. Fig. 10 shows how antennas' modes (activation or deactivation) are affected by the positions of the devices. For illustration, we only take the DA-imperfect-prob algorithm as an example due to the space constraints. It can be seen from Fig. 10(a) that by the proposed algorithms, those DAs close to the devices have higher probabilities of working while the central DAs far from the devices have higher probabilities of being deactivated to save power. This is originated that in terms of power-efficient design, letting those DAs far from the devices transmit signal is not power efficient. In contrast, as can be seen in Fig. 10(b) , the antennas in the CA systems have the same probabilities of being activated or deactivated. It is because the centralized antennas have similar PL to the devices, and their working modes are insensitive to users' positions.
A. Proposed Algorithms versus Benchmarks

B. CI Regions and Convergence Behavior
For the DA-imperfect-prob algorithm in Fig. 11(a) , the received symbols of the IR locate in the constructive region while those of the Eves fall in destructive region in a probabilistic manner, satisfying the preset outage probabilities η d and η k ∀k ∈ K. This verifies that even with the DA selection mechanism to save power, the proposed algorithm successfully keeps AN constructive for the IR whereas destructive for the Eves. It is because the algorithm statistically guarantees the IR's SINR higher than d and the Eves' SINR lower than the security threshold k . Fig. 11(b) shows the probabilities by the DA-imperfect-det algorithm. According to our analysis in Section III-B, the IR' SINR and Eves' security constraints should be satisfied with all the CSI uncertainties. This is verified by the simulation that the received symbols of the IR locate in the constructive region while those of the Eves Fig. 11 .
Distribution of received signals on complex plane of the (a) DA-imperfect-prob, (b) DA-imperfect-det, (c) DA-unknow-prob, and (d) DA-unknown-det algorithms. X-coordinate and Y-coordinate denote the real and imaginary parts on complex plane, corresponding to that in Fig. 2 . Red dots denote the received symbols of the Eves and blue dots denote the received symbols of the IR. Green cross denotes the IR's SINR requirement and black cross denotes the SINR constraint of Eves for addressing security. d = 20 dB, k = −10 dB ∀k ∈ K, η d = η k = 0.95, and p AN = 25 dBm. locate in the destructive region all the time, which is essentially different from the probabilistic optimization that allows proper outage occurs. However, as discussed in Fig. 5 , this is achieved at the cost of high power consumption. Differently, Fig. 11(c) and (d) shows the probabilities when the Eves' CSI is unknown. Both the probabilistic and deterministic robust optimization can locate the received symbols of the IR in the constructive region, which means the IR's SINR requirement is readily satisfied and AN is efficiently utilized. By setting the power level of AN higher than a threshold p AN , the received symbols of the Eves are completely randomized, leading to a higher symbol error rate at the Eves. Fig. 12 shows the convergence of the proposed algorithms for updating antenna selection vector t. It can be observed that the proposed algorithms are readily converged after five iterations, proving the low complexities of the algorithms.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the power minimization problem under physical layer security constraints for the DA systems. Targeting at the two practical scenarios, DA selection vector and precoding have been jointly optimized in terms of probabilistic and deterministic robust optimizations. By the chance-constrained formulations as well as the deterministic formulations in the two robust optimizations, the proposed algorithms are able to satisfy the IR's QoS and simultaneously address physical layer security against the Eves. Our simulation results have showed that the proposed algorithms consume much lower power compared to the CA-no-AS and DA-conv-AN benchmarks, and low complexities have been confirmed by our computational analysis and simulation. Furthermore, a flexible and device-centric network structure is featured benefiting from the antenna selection mechanism in DA systems, and the power consumption is maintained at low level regardless of the devices' positions compared to the CA counterpart.
APPENDIX ESSENCE OF THE MINIMUM POWER CONSTRAINT ON AN
In the conventional approaches, since the input signal is considered as the Gaussian signal with infinite constellation size, the generated AN at potential Eves is assumed to be uncorrelated with the confidential signal. Hence, the AN at Eves is treated as noise and its effect is considered to be harmful to potential Eves. In contrast to the Gaussian input, practical transmission always has to rely on real-world modulation, which implicates a finite set of constellation points and leads to finite-alphabet input. In this case, even AN is produced such that it lies in the null space of the receivers channel, the generated AN may indeed happen to be constructive to potential Eves. To clarify the essentiality of constraint (C20), let us write the kth Eves channel in the form of h k = √ ρh d + √ 1 − ρ . Parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] measures the strength of the channel correlation between the IR and kth Eves channels and ∈ CN (0, I N ) is a random vector independent of h d [69] . Evidently, ρ = 0 means the IR and kth Eves channels are uncorrelated. Hence, the received signal at the kth Eve can be equivalently written as
where u = w + ze −jφ d denotes the equivalent transmitting vector. The above equation can be further arranged into
where the first term represents the symbol of interest while the second term is a random vector varying in each transmission. Hence, the random term can be utilized to randomize the distribution of the Eve received signal and thus degrade the detection performance of the Eves [69] . For this purpose, the power of T u should be large enough to guarantee sufficient randomization to the phase of the Eves received signal. With unknown , we can place a constraint on the power of u instead. The average power of T u can be approximated as E{| T u| 2 } ≈ Tr(u H E{ H }u) = ||u|| 2 . Since we have u = w + ze −jφ d , imposing minimum power constraint on the AN z has the same effect to that of the vector u. Hence, the power constraint can be readily replaced by ||z|| 2 ≥ P AN , which randomizes the phase of the Eves received signal and hence deteriorates the Eves' symbol error rate performance.
